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THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT AND PATENT 
TROLLS IN EUROPE
Jonathan I. Tietz*
Healthy organisms inevitably produce cancer cells, and vibrant 
patent systems inevitably let bad patents slip through. These patents 
are harnessed by entities that leverage the uncertainty and expense of 
litigation to extract licenses from technological practitioners. Post-
issuance patent review (PIPR) has emerged as an invaluable error-
correcting mechanism to prevent the socially harmful assertion of 
improperly issued patents. The United States, with the America Invents 
Act, established a new system for PIPR, expanding administrative 
routes to curtail bad patents. Europe is going a step further with the 
Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPCA). The UPCA enables a low-
cost patent revocation action on a broad range of grounds and with a 
relaxed standing requirement. But this is an opt-in system with a loser-
pays fee-shifting arrangement. Thus, although the structure of the 
Unified Patent Court (UPC) appears to be set up to facilitate efficient 
PIPR, the disincentives for opting in suggest that the UPC will be a 
less effective troll-fighting vehicle than expected.  Indeed, patent trolls 
may simply opt for national patent systems.
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Introduction
In 2013, twenty-five European Union member states signed the Agree-
ment on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA), which establishes a new category 
of international patent under the exclusive jurisdiction of a centralized Uni-
fied Patent Court (UPC). The UPCA is meant to unify patent rights, de-
crease litigation and administration costs, and provide a means for improved 
post-issuance correction of erroneous patents. In part, this is intended to cur-
tail the practices of so-called patent trolls, nonpracticing patent-owning enti-
ties that assert bad patents against practicing third parties.
Structurally, the system is remarkably broad compared to those already 
in Europe and the United States. Compared to post-issuance patent review 
(PIPR) in the United States, the UPC could function as a more effective er-
ror-correction mechanism. Under the UPCA, revocation actions will be 
available for essentially any substantive ground of unpatentability, with 
amendment of the patent in question available as an alternative to wholesale 
revocation. On the other hand, several structural features suggest that UPCA 
may not effectively prevent patent-troll behavior. Namely, the combination 
of an apparently lax standing requirement, a loser-pays fee-shifting struc-
ture, a lack of judicial review, and a lack of preemption of national patent 
laws may dissuade unitary patent filings. This is especially likely because 
the patents most valuable to patent trolls are, due to geographical industrial 
asymmetry, only valuable in certain states. That is, the opt-in cost may out-
weigh the benefits.
This Note contends that the seemingly effective error-correction mech-
anisms created by the UPC may actually go too far, being too costly for pa-
tent owners to opt into the system. Part I outlines the importance of PIPR, 
particularly in the context of patent trolls. Part II reviews the structures of 
existing PIPR systems in the United States and Europe. Part III characteriz-
es the structure of PIPR under the UPC. Part IV views this structure through 
the lens of patent trolls, compares it with the United States, and asserts that 
certain aggressive features may nudge patent trolls to opt for national patent 
systems instead.
Spring 2019] The Unified Patent Court 305
I. The Importance of Post-Issuance Patent Review
Many consider strong patent protection to be essential for innovation.1
But overprotection of intellectual property can impede scientific and eco-
nomic progress.2 Accordingly, the structure of any given patent examination 
system reflects pragmatic compromises. The result is that even in a vibrant, 
innovation-rich patent system, two troublesome problems emerge.
First, bad, overbroad patents inevitably slip through. Second, there are 
perverse economic incentives to take advantage of these bad patents in the 
context of other structural elements of a patent protection system. The re-
sult? So-called patent trolls.3
A. The Bad Patent Problem
Every patent system includes substantive patentability requirements.4
The novelty and inventive-step (or non-obviousness)5 requirements are the 
most fundamental. These “doctrinal screens” are meant to ensure that the 
exclusivity of a patent is only available to truly new inventions. Any inef-
fectiveness of administering certain doctrinal screens might inadvertently 
1. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1576 (2003) (“Patent law is our primary policy tool to promote innovation, en-
courage the development of new technologies, and increase the fund of human knowledge.”). 
But see Rachel E. Sachs, The Uneasy Case for Patent Law, 117 MICH. L. REV. 499 (2018). 
2. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: 
Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 163, 175 (1994) 
(“Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.” (quoting Vanna 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993))); see also Michael 
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Bio-
medical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (noting problems of patent overprotection even in 
technologies where patents are typically considered essential).
3. The patent troll problem is not strictly limited to bad patents. In a practice referred 
to as “holdup,” a nonpracticing owner of an otherwise valid patent waits to enforce patent 
rights until it is strategic to do so—for instance, not when first learning that another company 
has infringed but perhaps when the company has been particularly successful. In the absence 
of laches defenses, this practice seems troublesome: after all, the nonpracticing patent owners
are not themselves practicing, or even licensing, the patented technology and is thus not eco-
nomically harmed by infringement; in contrast, the infringer is arguably increasing the public 
good and is harmed by relying on the patent owner’s non-assertion (especially when the vast 
universe of patents in densely crowded fields makes accidental infringement likely). But 
where the patent is technically valid and in compliance with the underlying standards of pa-
tentability, it is not normatively obvious that this is the same problem, especially in the ab-
sence in law of a patent use requirement. In contrast, the assertion of improperly issued, tech-
nically flawed patents plainly frustrates the purpose of the patent system and is difficult to 
defend. Accordingly, a thorough discussion of structural (dis)incentives of holdup-style patent 
trolling in the context of the European Union is beyond the scope of this manuscript. 
4. These are also called “doctrinal screens.” Christopher Buccafusco et al., Intelligent 
Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 75 (2018) (discussing the role of doctrinal screens in calibrating intel-
lectual property rights).
5. In contrast to much of the world, the United States’s term for “inventive step” is 
“non-obviousness.” See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
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allow overbroad patents to issue. But one of the fundamental causes of bad 
patents is simply inherent in the nature of progress. The universe of known 
technologies grows each day;6 the time spent on patent examination does 
not.7 Thus, patents that impermissibly overlap with known technology are 
frequently issued in error.8
B. Paying the Troll Toll: Impact and Drivers of Troll Activity
Structural features of patent law incentivize taking advantage of bad pa-
tents through a practice known as patent trolling.9 Patent trolls are nonprac-
ticing owners of patents10 who seek out potential infringers, wait for the in-
fringers to find financial success, and then threaten to sue, hoping to obtain 
favorable settlements. Trolls often rely on vaguely worded patents with un-
certain scopes.11
Patent litigation is expensive, complex, and uncertain—in the face of 
complicated technologies and at-times-fuzzy patent doctrines, determining 
infringement is difficult, especially for generalist judges and lay juries. So 
even if an asserted patent is probably bad, a defendant is likely to settle 
simply to mitigate the nuisance, risk, and expense of the lawsuit.
How substantial is the problem? Patent troll behavior hampers innova-
tion and generates waste, both in terms of litigation resources and lost 
wealth—to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars.12 There is generally 
6. It is hard to overstate the volume of previous technology. Relevant prior art in-
cludes all previous patents, written publications, products, and public presentations, among 
other forms prior art. More than ten million utility patents have been issued. 10 Million Pa-
tents, USPTO, https://10millionpatents.uspto.gov/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018). Scientific 
journal articles are more numerous—in excess of fifty million as of 2009. Sarah Boon, 21st 
Century Science Overload, CAN. SCI. PUB. (Jan. 7, 2017), http://blog.cdnsciencepub.com/
21st-century-science-overload/. Even with clever keyword searching, these are difficult to 
thoroughly compare against an application in a few hours.
7. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 2135, 2138 (2009) (“[G]iven the number of annual filings, it is hard to imagine any sce-
nario in which enough resources could be directed toward this effort to have a meaningful 
impact.”).
8. See generally id. at 2145–58 (reviewing general contributors to low patent quality).
9. Patent trolls are also commonly referred to as “nonpracticing entities” (NPEs) or 
“patent assertion entities” (PAEs), among other terms. See Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral 
Panics, Motions In Limine, and Patent Reform, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113, 116 (2015).
10. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010) 
(“[N]onpracticing entities (NPEs)—namely, firms that do not commercialize their patented 
inventions and perform little to no R & D—are often termed ‘patent trolls,’ because they tend 
to exploit litigation and licensing market defects to extract unwarranted rents from commer-
cializers, usually on patents that the commercializer was completely unaware of before the 
NPE’s demand for payment.”).
11. See James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 
REGULATION 26, 26 (2011–2012); see also Mark A. Lemley, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2197, 2240–43 (2016); supra note 11.
12. See Bessen et al., supra note 11, at 26 (finding that patent troll lawsuits “are associ-
ated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010”).
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less of a troll problem in Europe than in the United States, but the UPC may 
affect troll activity.13 Additionally, the growth of high-tech markets in the 
European Union may increasingly attract trolls.14
Many factors empower trolls. These include the size and wealth of a 
particular market, the availability of forum-shopping, the nature of fee-
shifting structures, the prevalence of bad patents, the expense of litigation 
for patent owners, the extent of ex ante uncertainty, and the remedies avail-
able to patent owners.15 Certain corrective systems have emerged in re-
sponse.
C. The Role of Post-Issuance Patent Review
In the face of bad patents and those who exploit them, the importance 
of patent-issuance error-correction has been recognized.16 After all, the as-
sertion of a patent that never should have been granted is wasteful. Thus, a 
variety of post-issuance systems exist for review of patent validity.
A word on terminology. Here, the term “post-issuance patent review” 
(PIPR) means any judicial or administrative proceeding in which the pa-
tent’s validity is reconsidered after the issuance of a patent.17
Administrative PIPR procedures have been implemented in part to fa-
cilitate error-checking of bad patents and to mitigate the effects of patent 
trolls. For instance, the legislative history of the America Invents Act 
(AIA), passed in 2011,18 highlights fighting patent trolls as a motivating fac-
tor behind much of that legislation.19 Indeed, the availability of PIPR seems 
both to impede patent trolls20 and to lower patent litigation costs.21
13. See generally Stefania Fusco, Markets and Patent Enforcement: A Comparative 
Investigation of Non-Practicing Entities in the United States and Europe, 20 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439 (2014) (examining the extent of patent troll activity in Eu-
rope).
14. See Andrews Bartels, European Tech Market Expected to Continue Slow Growth 
Through 2018, ZDNET (Aug. 16, 2017, 13:29 PDT), http://www.zdnet.com/article/european-
tech-market-will-continue-to-grow-slowly-at-around-2-in-euros/ (predicting growth, if mod-
est, in the European technology sector).
15. See generally Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 20322, April 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20322 (discussing empirical findings as to factors driving patent 
trolls). 
16. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 7, at 2161 (identifying post-issuance patent review as 
a general, frequently proposed vehicle for improving patent quality).
17. These are called, depending on the country, invalidity, revocation, or nullity ac-
tions.
18. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
19. See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents 
Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539 (2012).
20. See Joe Mullin, New Patent Review Process Saves Billions—So Why Is It Under 
Attack?, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 19, 2017, 8:51 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2017/09/new-patent-review-process-has-saved-billions-so-why-is-it-under-attack/; see also
Jason Rantanen, Inter Partes Review Statistics, PATENTLY-O (July 28, 2016), 
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Enabling PIPR, in effect, recognizes that market participants are more 
efficient than a disinterested, resource-limited patent office at flagging pa-
tentability issues and identifying prior art.22 But the structure of a given 
PIPR system is highly significant. A PIPR system might be too punitive to 
legitimate patent owners or too inaccessible to patent challengers. Ideally, 
PIPR provides specialized mechanisms to adjudicate patent validity at low 
cost with high accuracy. To accommodate legitimate patents that might be 
only slightly overbroad, PIPR systems might allow amending a challenged 
patent.
II. Structures of Existing Post-Issuance Patent
Review Systems in the United States and Europe
Europe and the United States have distinct procedural systems for post-
issuance review of patent validity. This Part explores the structure of each. 
Section II.A introduces the vehicles for patent validity review in the United 
States—namely, litigation and the administrative procedures available under 
the America Invents Act. Section II.B introduces the systems operative in 
Europe—namely, piecewise litigation under the substantive law of each 
member state, as well as opposition proceedings before the European Patent 
Office (EPO).
A. The United States
The validity of patents issued in the United States can be contested in 
both litigation and administrative proceedings.
Litigation is not ideal for fighting patent trolls. Faced with a bad patent, 
an accused infringer can seek a declaratory judgment of invalidity or argue 
an invalidity defense.23 But patent trial costs are especially high, which, 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/07/partes-review-statistics.html (surveying patent invalida-
tion rates in administrative patent review procedure).
21. See, e.g., Malathi Nayak, Cost of Patent Litigation Falling Sharply, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.bna.com/cost-patent-infringement-n73014463011/ (identifying 
administrative review procedure as a factor in falling cost of patent litigation in the United 
States).
22. Compare Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 1495 (2001), with Michael Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance 
at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
23. See generally 6A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.02 (reviewing 
invalidity defenses); 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.03[4] (reviewing declaratory judgment). See
also 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3) (2012) (establishing grounds for invalidity defenses). A patent 
owner is precluded from asserting later a patent found invalid at trial. Blonder-Tongue Labs., 
Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50 (1971).
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coupled with high ex ante uncertainty surrounding patent validity, incentiv-
izes settlement even if the asserted patent is improper.24
Under the AIA, several administrative PIPR proceedings are newly 
available to cancel or amend a bad patent.25 These include several largely 
similar proceedings: inter partes review (IPR), covered business method re-
view (CBMR), and post-grant review (PGR).26 These are all adversarial 
procedures before an administrative tribunal, the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB). Each varies—for instance, PGR is available for only nine 
months after a patent issues, but the patent can be challenged on any 
ground.27 IPR is available at almost any time,28 but the grounds of challenge 
are restricted.29 CBMR allows a challenge on any ground but is restricted to 
a narrow subset of subject-matter and is available only to parties that have 
been sued for infringement.30
Administrative PIPR procedures in the United States suffer from sever-
al perceived drawbacks. For one, their constitutional legitimacy is still being 
explored—the general constitutionality of such administrative determina-
tions of property rights was recently upheld, but the Supreme Court noted 
an open question as to the constitutionality in certain situations.31 Second, in 
some respects, the PTAB employs different legal standards than district 
courts do, and the estoppel effect of validity judgments or determinations of 
patent scope are uncertain.32 Third, while meant to be an efficiency-
24. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Maurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 (2014) (estimating the burden of litigation by patent trolls at 
$29 billion annually).
25. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
26. See generally 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.07 (describing 
post-allowance procedures at the United States Patent and Trademark Office).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 321.
28. There are some slight qualifications to availability for IPRs, which cannot be filed 
sooner than nine months following patent issuance, see id. § 311(c)(1), and can only be filed 
within twelve months of the suit if the filing party has been sued for infringement, see id. §
315(b).
29. See id. § 311.
30. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) (2017) (establishing that a CBMR petition may only be 
filed by a party sued for infringement); id. § 42.303 (CBMR available any time after PGR); id.
§ 42.304 (establishing substantive grounds for challenge).
31. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 
(2018). The Court held that, under the public-rights doctrine, inter partes review by the 
USPTO does not violate Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1373; see also id. at 1379 
(“[W]e address only the precise constitutional challenges that Oil States raised here. Oil States 
does not challenge the retroactive application of inter partes review, even though that proce-
dure was not in place when its patent issued.”).
32. For instance, up until a November 2018 rule change, the PTAB and district courts 
used slightly different standards in interpreting patent scope. PTAB Issues Claim Construction 
Final Rule, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-
appeal-board/procedures/ptab-issues-claim-construction (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). The rela-
tionship between the PTAB and district courts vis-à-vis issue preclusion is still unsettled. See
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enhancing substitute for litigation, administrative PIPR has become a rou-
tine addendum to litigation.33 Fourth, there is some contention that the re-
laxed procedural requirements and legal standards have resulted in a system 
that is too aggressive in finding patents invalid and has given rise to “re-
verse trolling”—that is, using PIPR to extort settlements from patent own-
ers.34
B. Europe
Post-issuance review of patents in Europe is more complex due to the 
coexistence of multiple patent law systems, including individual national 
bodies of patent law and several international agreements, most prominently 
the European Patent Convention (EPC).35 An inventor may procure a patent 
(1) through examination by an individual national patent office, submitted 
directly in each nation in which protection is desired, yielding “national pa-
tents”; or (2) through a single application before the EPO followed by indi-
vidual validation in applicant-designated EPC signatory countries, yielding 
“European patents.”36 But despite a centralized examination process, a “Eu-
ropean patent” under the EPC is really just a bundle of national patents.
There is one EPC-wide post-issuance review system, but it is very nar-
row. Patents issued through the EPO are subject to challenge for nine 
months after issuance through the opposition procedure.37 Opposition is ad-
versarial and administrative;38 any person may file an opposition.39 The 
grounds on which a patent may be challenged in an opposition are limited to 
Jonathan I. Tietz, The “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” and Applying Issue Preclusion 
to Administrative Patent Claim Construction, 117 MICH. L. REV. 349 (2018).
33. It is becoming common practice to file petitions for inter partes review of asserted 
patents as part of a general litigation defense strategy. See, e.g., Matt Cutler, Inter Partes Re-
view—Not Just an Anti-Troll Proceeding, LAW360 (July 21, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/679716/inter-partes-review-not-just-an-anti-troll-proceeding
(describing such strategy).
34. See Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry Settlements at the Patent Of-
fice, 54 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30 (2018).
35. Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 (European Patent 
Convention), http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html [hereinafter EPC]. The 
membership of the EPC includes all Member States of the European Union as well as several 
non-EU countries. Joseph Kenneth Yarsky, Note, Hastening Harmonization in European Un-
ion Patent Law Through a Preliminary Reference Power, 40 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
167, 173 (2017). 
36. EPC, supra note 35, art. 65(1) (“Any Contracting State may . . . prescribe that the 
proprietor of the patent shall supply to its central industrial property office a translation of the 
patent . . . in one of its official languages . . . .”).
37. Id. art. 99. The grounds of patentability are limited to EPC articles 52–57—
essentially, subject matter, novelty, inventive step, and industrial application. See also Oppo-
sitions, EUR. PATENT OFFICE (last updated Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.epo.org/
applying/european/oppositions.html.
38. EPC, supra note 35, art. 99.
39. Id. art. 99(3).
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patentability (including subject matter, novelty, inventive step), incomplete 
disclosure, and improper support for amendments.40
Beyond the nine-month window for bringing an opposition, the EPC al-
lows for limitation (i.e., amendment) or revocation (i.e., invalidation) of a 
European patent before the EPO, which, if successful, are effective in all 
applicable countries.41 But only a patent owner can seek limitation or revo-
cation.42 Hence, this is not an effective anti-troll PIPR vehicle but simply a 
low-risk way for a patent owner to proactively narrow the scope of a ques-
tionable patent.
Thus, given the limits of EPO opposition, limitation, and revocation 
proceedings, the main way to conduct PIPR of a bad patent in Europe is 
country-by-country litigation. Despite some harmonization of substantive 
patent law across Europe,43 however, litigation procedures vary in ways that 
can affect troll behavior.
There is variation across the European Union as to who is entitled to re-
quest review of validity of a patent. France, for instance, has strict require-
ments that a party seeking invalidity must possess “sufficient interest to free 
the patented technique from any patent protection and demonstrate that the 
patent is an actual threat to its economic activity.”44 In contrast, German law 
permits any party to bring an action for invalidity,45 as does the law of the 
United Kingdom.46 In general, invalidity actions are permissive; only a 
handful of European Union member states appear to have meaningful stand-
ing requirements.47 There is also variation as to whether infringement and 
40. Id. art. 100.
41. Id. art. 105a.
42. Id. art. 105a(1).
43. See Yarsky, supra note 35, at 168–73 (recounting the history of patent law harmo-
nization efforts in Europe, including the European Patent Convention in 1977).
44. See Thomas Bouvet & Isabelle Bertaux, French Court Rules on Patent Revocation 
Interest to Sue, Statutes of Limitation, JONES DAY (July 19, 2017), http://www.jonesday.com/
french-court-rules-on-patent-revocation-interest-to-sue-statutes-of-limitation-07-19-2017/.
45. See EUROPEAN PATENT ACADEMY, PATENT LITIGATION IN EUROPE 33–34 (4th ed. 
2016), https://www.epo.org/learning-events/materials/litigation.html [hereinafter PATENT 
LITIGATION IN EUROPE].
46. See id. at 52.
47. Sweden, for example, allows any person who has suffered damage or a govern-
ment-designated authority to bring such an action. See id. at 117. Finland limits availability to 
a “person who suffers prejudice on account of the patent” but also allows “a public authority 
appointed by the government for reasons of public interest.” Id. at 45. A few nations, includ-
ing Slovenia, provide that “any interested party” may bring an invalidity action. Id. at 121. 
The phrasing in the laws of Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, and Portugal are similar. See
generally id. In general, however, most countries allow any party to bring such an action 
through some procedure, whether administrative or judicial. See generally id. This is because 
invalidity review is often left to administrative agencies. Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley, Why 
Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 90 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1732 (2013) (observing that “in 
many other countries, like Germany, validity and infringement are entirely separate, with the 
courts resolving only infringement and leaving validity review to the technical boards of ap-
peal within the patent office”) [hereinafter Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide?].
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validity issues are tried together (as in the United Kingdom) or separately 
(i.e., “bifurcation,” as in Germany).48
Substantive law differs too. The interpretation of each ground on which 
a patent may be revoked is a matter of national law.49 For instance, in com-
paring two otherwise identical patents with the same prior art, the laws of 
one country might interpret certain terminology differently than another 
country. Or these laws might evaluate different factors in judicial tests for 
novelty or obviousness, leading to a nation-by-nation patchwork of validity.
Accordingly, a party seeking to subject a bad patent to PIPR must do so 
in individual countries with variations in substantive and procedural law—
heightening both economic and legal uncertainty ex ante.50 There exists no 
international PIPR option in Europe. The anticipated UPC system, however, 
will change this, as discussed next.
III. The European Union’s Unified Patent Court (UPC)
This Part examines the structure of post-issuance patent review under 
the European Union’s unitary patent system. Section III.A briefly reviews 
the status of the Unified Patent Court (UPC). Section III.B describes its 
general structure. Section III.C concentrates on the aspects of the UPC rele-
vant to PIPR.
48. See Katrin Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis of the Bifurcated Pa-
tent Litigation System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 218, 219, 240–41 (2014) 
(finding that whether or not a system is bifurcated affects the likelihood of challenge of validi-
ty and likelihood of settlement). This has implications for the effectiveness of PIPR—first, 
remedies may become prematurely available to a patent troll if an infringement proceeding is 
resolved before a validity proceeding; and second, in a bifurcated action the owner of a bad 
patent is free to pursue a broad interpretation of the patent’s scope in an infringement proceed-
ing while pursuing a narrower interpretation during review of validity, undermining the use-
fulness of an invalidity action as a means of PIPR. See Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide?, su-
pra note 47, at 1732 (noting that “bifurcation [] raises the risk that a patent claim will be 
treated ‘like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction,’ with both par-
ties urging inconsistent positions before different tribunals depending on whether the issue is 
validity or infringement”).
49. See EPC, supra note 35, art. 2(2) (“The European patent shall, in each of the Con-
tracting States for which it is granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions 
as a national patent granted by that State, unless this Convention provides otherwise.”); id. art. 
74 (“Unless this Convention provides otherwise, the European patent application as an object 
of property shall, in each designated Contracting State and with effect for such State, be sub-
ject to the law applicable in that State to national patent applications.”).
50. See, e.g., Yarsky, supra note 35, at 170 (“The authority of national courts to hear 
cases of validity and infringement leads to inconsistent results among states and uncertainty 
when an inventor seeks to protect her intellectual property rights.”).
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A. The Status of the UPC
A new unitary patent system is the subject of an agreement (the UPCA) 
between most of the EU Member States.51 The UPCA establishes the UPC, 
which has competence over European patents and “unitary patents.”52 Un-
like European patents, unitary patents are essentially single European Un-
ion–wide intellectual property rights.53 The preamble to the UPCA lists as a 
foundational goal enhancing the revocation of improper patents.54 Addition-
ally, the Commission has opined that the UPC will not be amenable to pa-
tent troll behavior.55
The signatory states (twenty-five European Union member states, ex-
cluding Croatia, Poland, and Spain) signed the UPCA on February 19, 
2013.56 This followed in the wake of two enabling “enhanced cooperation” 
regulations that authorized unitary patents.57 Sixteen states have now ratified 
the UPCA,58 and the EPO expects that the UPC will begin operating in the 
first half of 2019.59
51. Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1 [hereinafter UPCA]; 
About the UPC, UNIFIED PATENT COURT, https://www.unified-patent-court.org/ (last visited 
May 7, 2019).
52. Id. at 2–3. Unitary patents are also known as “European patents with unitary ef-
fect,” or EPUEs. See id. art. 2(f).
53. With the exception of a few Member States not a party to the UPCA.
54. UPCA, supra note 51, at 1 (“WISHING to improve the enforcement of patents and 
the defense against unfounded claims and patents which should be revoked and to enhance 
legal certainty by setting up a Unified Patent Court for litigation relating to the infringement 
and validity of patents;”).
55. See Written Question by Members of the European Parliament and their Answers 
Given by a European Union Institution, 2014 O.J. (C 221) 307 (“The Commission fails to see 
how the recent Union legislation on patents, namely Regulations 1257/2012 and 1260/2012, 
could increase the activity of so called ‘patent trolls’ in Europe. . . . The UPC Agreement pro-
vides for safeguards against ‘patent trolls’. . . .  The objective is to ensure that the patent valid-
ity is dealt with before the infringement action can proceed.”).
56. PATENT LITIGATION IN EUROPE, supra note 45, at 135; Establishment of the Uni-
fied Patent Court (UPC), HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/unified-patent-court-agreement-
including-signatories-and-ratification.
57. Regulation 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 De-
cember 2012, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary 
Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361); Council Regulation 1260/2012, Implementing Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection with Regard to the Ap-
plicable Translation Arrangements, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 89; see also Markus B. Boelling & 
Thomas Koerfer, Unitary Patent Protection in Europe—An Attunement on the Upcoming New 
System, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 493, 497–501 (2014) (discussing these regulations).
58. See Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC) – Ratification Details, GENERAL 
SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-
publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2013001 (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
59. When Will the Unitary Patent System Start?, EUR. PATENT OFFICE, 
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/unitary-patent/start.html (last visited Sept. 28, 
2018).
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The UPC’s legality has been questioned, but the Court of Justice has so 
far found it to be compatible with European Union law. Namely, Spain in 
2013 unsuccessfully challenged the two unitary-patent regulations on 
grounds of lack of judicial review, impermissible delegation, and discrimi-
nation on the basis of language.60 Recently, a complainant in Germany has 
challenged the country’s own implementing legislation, delaying the 
UPCA’s formal ratification.61 Because the complaint alleges incompatibility 
of the UPC with European Union law, it is likely that the German constitu-
tional court will refer at least one question to the Court of Justice, further 
delaying implementation,62 although the court might consider the question 
to have been already answered under the acte clair doctrine, considering 
60. In Case C-146/13, Spain v. European Parliament, 2015 WL Celex No. 613CJ0146, 
Spain challenged Regulation 1257/2012 (implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the creation of unitary patent protection) on the grounds of “infringement of the values of the 
rule of law,” a “lack of legal basis,” a “misuse of powers,” “infringement of Article 291(2) 
TFEU and . . . Meroni v High Authority,” “infringement of those principles owing to the del-
egation to the EPO of certain administrative tasks relating to the EPUE,” and “infringement of 
the principles of autonomy and uniform application of EU law.” Id. ¶ 23. Spain had argued 
principally that the Unitary Patent system was not subject to judicial review, threatening the 
uniform application of Union law and the protection of fundamental rights. Id. ¶ 24. Spain 
objected also to the procedures under which fees were set and argued that the EU had imper-
missibly delegated power contrary to the Meroni doctrine. The Court pointed out that the EU 
is not a party to the European Patent Convention or the UPCA, id. ¶¶ 82, 85, that the proce-
dure for granting European patents had not been incorporated into EU law, id. ¶ 30, that the 
Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of an international agreement con-
cluded by the member states, id. ¶ 101, and that the EU itself had not delegated any exclusive 
power, id. ¶ 87.
The challenge under Case C-147/13, Spain v. Council, 2015 WL Celex No. 613CJ0147 
(concerning the translation arrangements) was similar. There, Spain mainly alleged infringe-
ment of the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of language, given certain language 
restrictions at the UPC. Id. ¶¶ 22–25. The Court found, however, that such language discrimi-
nation was justified—satisfying proportionality analysis—by the legitimate objective of crea-
tion of a uniform and simple translation regime so as to facilitate access to patent protection 
by making the patent system simpler, less costly, and legally more secure. Id. ¶¶ 31–48.
61. A decision has not been reached, and few case details are public. See Thosten 
Bausch, UPC – Finally some News from the German Federal Constitutional Court, KLUWER 
PATENT BLOG (Aug. 16, 2017), http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2017/08/16/upc-finally-
some-news-from-the-german-federal-constitutional-court/; Richard Pinckney, Complainant in 
UPC German Constitutional Challenge Publishes Update, BRISTOWS UPC (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.bristowsupc.com/latest-news/complainant-in-upc-german-constitutional-
challenge-publishes-update/. But in an interesting parallel to common criticisms of adminis-
trative post-issuance patent review (e.g., IPR) in the United States, the challenge includes al-
legations of insufficient procedural safeguards and a lack of judicial independence in the UPC 
system. See Alexander Klicznik & Lukas Sievers, UPC and Germany: Status Update - Con-
stitutional Complaint, Ratification Timeline and More, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bfe0c73a-8b0e-4e37-9efd-f1407e3e9a92.
62. See European Patent Institute, What We Know About the Status of the Unitary Pa-
tent and Unified Patent Court Project in Mid September 2017, EPI INFORMATION (Sept. 
2017), https://information.patentepi.com/issue-3-2017/what-we-know-about-the-status-of-the-
unitary-patent-and-unified-patent-court-project-in-mid-september-2017.html.
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Spain’s litigation.63 This and Brexit64 stand as the last roadblocks to imple-
mentation.
B. General Structure of the UPC
The UPC is an international legal system resembling a specialized hy-
brid of a patent agency and a court.
The UPC “shall be a court common to the Contracting Member States 
and thus subject to the same obligations under Union law as any national 
court of the Contracting Member States.”65 The UPC draws from European 
Union law, among other sources, although it is not a European Union 
body.66 Several specific sources of law are explicitly applicable, namely Eu-
ropean Union law, including the two enhanced-cooperation regulations;67
the UPCA itself; the EPC; applicable international agreements; and national 
law in certain circumstances.68 The contractual and noncontractual liability 
of the UPCA is expressly governed not only by contracting member state 
law but also by European Union regulations.69 Indeed, Article 20 declares 
that “[t]he Court shall apply Union law in its entirety and shall respect its 
primacy,”70 and the UPC is bound by decisions of the Court of Justice.71
The UPCA establishes a centralized system not only for patent exami-
nation but also for litigation, hearing claims and counterclaims for in-
fringement and validity (under the UPCA, “revocation”).72 The court com-
prises a Court of First Instance (CFI) (with central, regional, and local 
divisions) and a Court of Appeal.73
63. See supra note 60.
64. See PATENT LITIGATION IN EUROPE, supra note 45, at 135.
65. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 1; see also id. art. 4(1) (“The Court shall have legal per-
sonality in each Contracting Member State and shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity 
accorded to legal persons under the national law of that State.”).
66. Id. art. 24. Although the unitary patent is affirmatively authorized by the European 
Patent Convention (EPC), see EPC, supra note 35, art. 142, Unified Patent Court and the uni-
tary patent system are available only to European Union member states and not to non-EU 
EPC signatories. See Boelling & Koerfer, supra note 57, at 497.
67. Regulation 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 De-
cember 2012, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary 
Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361); Council Regulation 1260/2012, Implementing Enhanced
Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection with Regard to the Ap-
plicable Translation Arrangements, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 89.
68. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 24. 
69. See id. art. 5.
70. Id. art. 20.
71. Id. art. 21.
72. Id. arts. 32, 65.
73. Id. arts. 6(1), 7(1). The central division is to be seated in Paris, with sections also in 
London and Munich. Id. art. 7(2). The continued presence of the London section is especially 
intriguing in light of Brexit. Regional divisions are to be established for groups of Contracting 
States, whereas local divisions are specific to individual Contracting States. Id. arts. 7(3)–(5).
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In general, the judicial panels of the CFI resemble those of an ordinary, 
if specialized, court. The UPCA establishes two categories of judges: legal-
ly qualified and technically qualified.74 Members of the former are required 
to “possess the qualifications required for appointment to judicial offices in 
a Contracting Member State”; the latter must have “a university degree and 
proven expertise in a field of technology” and have “proven knowledge of 
civil law and procedure relevant in patent litigation.”75 Both must have 
“proven experience in the field of patent litigation.”76
By default, panels of the local and regional divisions are obligatorily 
multinational77 and entirely comprise legally qualified judges.78 Panels may 
request allocation of one technically qualified judge sua sponte or at the re-
quest of a party.79 Additionally, where patent validity is in question—
revocation actions or counterclaims—a technically qualified judge is typi-
cally required.80 Panels of the central division, which has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over stand-alone revocation claims, consist of two legally qualified and 
one technically qualified judge.81 Panels of the Court of Appeal are also 
multinational and comprise five judges: three legally qualified and two 
technically qualified.82
Thus, although for infringement claims it resembles an ordinary, if spe-
cialized, court, for revocation claims (where the questions at hand are par-
ticularly technical) the UPC begins to resemble a specialized administrative 
body.83
C. Post-Issuance Patent Review under the UPCA
The vehicle for post-issuance error-checking under the UPCA is the 
revocation action, which may be brought either for unitary or European pa-
74. Id. art. 15(1).
75. Id. arts. 15(2), 15(3).
76. Id. art. 15(1).
77. Id. art. 8(1).
78. Id. arts. 8(3), 8(4).
79. Id. art. 8(5).
80. Id. art. 33(3)(a). Parties may, alternatively, simply agree to be heard by a single 
legally qualified judge in lieu of such a panel. Id. art. 8(7).
81. Id. art. 8(6).
82. Id. art. 9(1).
83. Compare, for instance, to the United States: in patent litigation, neither the judge 
nor any of the litigating attorneys need have any meaningful technical qualifications; in ad-
ministrative review proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, however, the judg-
es are usually technically qualified (often with work experience or graduate education), and 
the attorneys must be admitted to practice before the USPTO—that is, having passed a patent-
specific registration exam and possessing certain technical education qualifications. See
Saurabh Vishnubhakatet al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court 
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 52–54 (2016) (comparing district court judges and 
administrative patent judges and the contribution of the difference to forum-shopping in dis-
trict courts). 
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tents.84 The UPC has a limited period of concurrent jurisdiction with nation-
al courts for review of European patents85 but has exclusive jurisdiction over 
unitary patents.86 The UPC has no jurisdiction over national patents.
Grounds for revocation are expressly enumerated and include subject 
matter, novelty, inventive step, definiteness, industrial application, adequate 
disclosure, among others.87 This essentially equates the standards for revo-
cation actions and patent examination.
The UPCA imparts no timing requirement for revocation actions,88 in 
contrast to the EPO’s nine-month window for oppositions89 and the UPCA’s 
five-year limitations period for monetary-damages actions.90
Importantly, a revocation action is not a binary, valid-or-invalid in-
quiry. Rather, the UPCA imparts a patent limitation requirement in revoca-
tion proceedings.91 If only a part of a patent is deemed invalid, the patent is 
modified accordingly by amendment rather than being struck down entirely. 
This Article 65(3) requirement is couched as a mandate upon the court,92
and it is nearly identical to its counterpart in the EPC concerning revocation 
actions at the EPO.93 These requirements cooperate with EPC Article 
138(3), which gives patent owners the right to limit by amendment a patent 
whose validity is before a competent authority.94
The forum for a revocation action is limited. UPCA Article 33 estab-
lishes the competence of the Court of First Instance (CFI),95 in which stand-
alone revocation actions are limited to the central division.96 If a parallel in-
fringement proceeding is pending, the revocation action is to be brought in 
84. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 32(1)(d).
85. Id. art. 83(1) (establishing seven-year transitional period of concurrent jurisdiction).
86. Id. art. 32(1).
87. Id. art. 65(2). These are defined by reference to the EPC and are equivalent to the 
patentability grounds described therein.
88. Id. art. 32(1)(d), (e).
89. EPC, supra note 35, art. 99(1).
90. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 72 (“[A]ctions relating to all forms of financial compen-
sation may not be brought more than five years after the date on which the applicant became 
aware, or had reasonable grounds to become aware, of the last fact justifying the action.”).
91. Id. art. 65(3).
92. Id. art. 65(3) (“Without prejudice to Article 138(3) of the EPC, if the grounds for 
revocation affect the patent only in part, the patent shall be limited by a corresponding 
amendment of the claims and revoked in part.” (emphasis added)).
93. EPC, supra note 35, art. 138(2) (“If the grounds for revocation affect the European 
patent only in part, the patent shall be limited by a corresponding amendment of the claims 
and revoked in part.” (emphasis added)).
94. Id. art. 138(3) (“In proceedings before the competent court or authority relating to 
the validity of the European patent, the proprietor of the patent shall have the right to limit the 
patent by amending the claims. The patent as thus limited shall form the basis for the proceed-
ings.”).
95. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 33.
96. Id. art. 33(4).
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the same local or regional division;97 this is true also of revocation counter-
claims.98 A local or regional division, however, has the discretion to refer 
the revocation to the central division.99 Where a local or regional division 
keeps the revocation action, it must also request allocation of a technically 
qualified judge from a centralized pool.100 This transforms the panel into one 
resembling the central division.
The UPCA authorizes not only revocation counterclaims but direct rev-
ocation actions themselves.101 Curiously, it is unclear exactly who is entitled 
to bring such an action. Article 47(6) provides:102
Any other natural or legal person, or any body entitled to bring ac-
tions in accordance with its national law, who is concerned by a pa-
tent, may bring actions in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.
The meaning of “who is concerned by a patent”103 is not clear, but 
comparison to the phrasing of the rules for opposition before the EPO sug-
gests that it is perhaps stricter than the EPO’s “any person”104—especially 
because other language in the UPCA was seemingly directly imported from 
the EPC. The EPC provides:105
Within nine months of the publication of the mention of the grant 
of the European patent in the European Patent Bulletin, any person
may give notice to the European Patent Office of opposition to that 
patent, in accordance with the Implementing Regulations. . . .
The Draft Rules of Procedure for the UPC do not directly address 
standing.106 Despite the phrase “who is concerned by a patent” in Article 
97. Id.
98. Id. art. 33(3).
99. Id. 
100. Id. art. 33(3)(a).
101. Id. art. 32(1)(d) (establishing competence for revocation actions).
102. Id. art. 47(6) (emphasis added).
103. The German version of the UPCA uses the word “betroffen”:
(6) Jede andere natürliche oder juristische Person oder jede Vereinigung, die von 
einem Patent betroffen und nach dem für sie geltenden nationalen Recht berechtigt 
ist, Klage zu erheben, kann nach Maßgabe der Verfahrensordnung Klage erheben.
The French uses “concerné”:
6. Toute autre personne physique ou morale, ou tout organisme habilité à engager 
une action conformément à son droit national, qui est concerné par un brevet, peut 
engager une action conformément au règlement de procédure.
See 2013 O.J. EPO 287, 319, http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj013/05_13/05_2873.pdf.
104. EPC, supra note 35, art. 99(1).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. See generally Preliminary Set of Provisions for the Rules of Procedure of the Uni-
fied Patent Court, 18th Draft of Oct. 19, 2015 (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.unified-patent-
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47(6)—hinting at a requirement of economic or legal interest—the require-
ments for a “statement for revocation” in the Draft Rules include no re-
quirement of a statement of concern or a demonstration of interest.107 In con-
trast, for patent infringement, the Rules affirmatively require filing evidence 
that the claimant, if not the patent owner, is “entitled to commence proceed-
ings.”108 A similar requirement is found for a declaration of non-
infringement.109
Other European Union law does not clearly resolve the issue. The Uni-
tary Patent Regulation (UPR) includes some provisions detailing when na-
tional law applies. Article 7, for instance, specifies which national law ap-
plies to a given unitary patent based on the applicant’s residency or 
business, treating the patent as an object of property in that jurisdiction.110
Article 5(3), in turn, seems to base the scope of protection and limitations 
on the national law designated by Article 7.111 As noted, individual countries 
differ in who is permitted to bring a revocation action under national law,112
and so if national law is the determinant of who may bring a revocation ac-
tion at the UPC, a patchwork will result, in tension with Article 5(2)’s em-
phasis on uniform scope.113 Indeed, under the UPCA, revocation is largely 
court.org/sites/default/files/upc_rules_of_procedure_18th_draft_15_march_2017_final_clear.
pdf [hereinafter Draft Rules of Procedure].
107. See id. r. 44.
108. See id. r. 13.1(f) (requiring when stating an infringement claim “where the claimant 
is not the proprietor of the patent concerned, or not the only proprietor, evidence to show the 
claimant is entitled to commence proceedings”). Rule 13.1 contains a number of other plead-
ing requirements. Rule 44, which governs pleading of revocation actions, includes some of the 
Rule 13.1 requirements, but conspicuously omits 13.1(f). See id. r. 44.
109. See id. r. 63(a) (requiring the particulars of Rule 13.1, including evidence to show 
the claimant is entitled to commence proceedings). 
110. Regulation 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 De-
cember 2012, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary 
Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 5, art. 7(1) [hereinafter Unitary Patent Regulation] (“A
European patent with unitary effect as an object of property shall be treated in its entirety and 
in all the participating Member States as a national patent of the participating Member State in 
which that patent has unitary effect and in which, according to the European Patent Regis-
ter . . . the applicant had his residence or principal place of business . . . or [] where . . . the 
applicant had a place of business on the date of filing.”); see also id. art. 7(3) (providing that 
German national law applies if an applicant has no residence or business in a Contracting 
State).
111. See id. art. 5(3) (“The acts against which the patent provides protection referred to 
in paragraph 1 and the applicable limitations shall be those defined by the law applied to Eu-
ropean patents with unitary effect in the participating Member State whose national law is 
applicable to the European patent with unitary effect as an object of property in accordance 
with Article 7.”). Article 5(3) might, instead, be narrow—it specifies that the applicable law is 
“the law applied to European patents with unitary effect in the participating Member State 
whose national law is applicable,” which seems to suggest law implementing the unitary pa-
tent system. See id.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 44–48.
113. See Unitary Patent Regulation, supra note 111, art. 5(2) (emphasizing that “[t]he 
scope of [the unitary patent] right and its limitations shall be uniform in all participating 
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centralized, suggesting that national law should not apply in this respect, so 
as not to undermine the effectiveness of such centralization. Further, the 
UPC’s structure resembles the German patent system, German law applies 
when no particular national law clearly applies,114 and under German law, 
any party may bring revocation. Thus, it is probably appropriate to read Ar-
ticle 7 as regarding substantive, not procedural, patent law—there only to 
fill gaps in the UPCA.115
The “concerned by” language of Article 47 evokes the concepts of di-
rect and individual concern in European Union law.116 Given that European 
Union law has primacy under the UPCA, these concepts might be import-
ed.117 If so, however, it is still puzzling that the Draft Rules of Procedure for 
the UPC contain requirements for detailed pleading of grounds of unpatent-
ability in a revocation action but no requirement of a statement of concern.
Article 42 also imposes proportionality and fairness requirements.118
Perhaps allowing any party—regardless of economic or legal interest—to 
bring a revocation action at any time in the lifetime of a patent might run 
afoul of fairness, as property stands to be taken away.119 Consider Article 
69, which establishes that the losing party in an action before the UPC will 
bear the legal costs of the winner.120 If any party, regardless of legal or eco-
Member States in which the patent has unitary effect”). On the other hand, these “rights and 
limitations” are likely those outlined in UPCA arts. 25–30, delineating the rights of a patent 
owner to exclude others from practicing an invention and providing limitations on who the 
patent owner may exclude. See UPCA supra note 52, arts. 25–30. These provisions do not 
address the separate issue of what the scope of the technology covered by the patent—and the 
conditions of its issuance—are. See id.
114. See Case C-146/13, Spain v. European Parliament, 2015 WL Celex No. 
613CJ0146, ¶ 16.
115. For example, questions of patent claim term interpretation, findings of facts, and 
the like.
116. See, e.g., Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 263, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 162 [hereinafter TFEU] (“Any natural or 
legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute 
proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual con-
cern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not en-
tail implementing measures.”).
117. See UPCA, supra note 51, art. 20 (“The Court shall apply Union law in its entirety 
and shall respect its primacy.”).
118. Id. art. 42.
119. See, e.g., Anje Lunze & Jan Phillip Rektorschek, Can You Afford to Litigate in the 
Unified Patent Court?, MANAGING IP (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.managingip.com/Article/
3480083/Can-you-afford-to-litigate-in-the-Unified-Patent-Court.html, also available at 
https://deutschland.taylorwessing.com/documents/get/194/can-you-afford-to-litigate-in-the-
upc.pdf (warning potential patent clients of the risk of exposure to legal fees via revocation 
filings by third parties).
120. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 69(1) (“Reasonable and proportionate legal costs and 
other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a general rule, be borne by the unsuc-
cessful party, unless equity requires otherwise, up to a ceiling set in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure.”).
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nomic interest, may institute a revocation action, this may be unfair under 
Article 42 (especially if a patent owner never intended to assert its patent).121
On the other hand, the UPC might decline to fee-shift in such a situation 
under the equitable exception in Article 69.122
The European Patent Convention—from which much of UPC law is 
imported—does not clarify. The EPC delineates its impact on national law 
but has no provision describing standing.123
There is another way to read Article 47(6): the phrase “who is con-
cerned by a patent” might be read to modify only the phrase “any body enti-
tled to bring actions in accordance with . . . national law.”124 In that case, 
“concerned by a patent” seems to impose a requirement that governmental 
bodies (as opposed to individuals and private juridical entities) who bring 
revocation actions have some relation to patent law.125 For example, a des-
ignated public prosecutor (or perhaps an official acting on behalf of a coun-
try’s patent office) who deals with patents could bring a revocation action 
on behalf of the government, but a local magistrate could not. This would be 
consistent with the current practices of certain UPCA signatories—for ex-
ample, Finland, Italy, and Sweden.126 This also appears to be consistent with 
the grammatical structure of the German version of Article 47(6).127
Thus, the exact threshold for revocation standing seems unclear, but, 
given that revocation is intended to be a centralized procedure surrounding a 
121. See id. art. 42.
122. Id. art. 69.
123. EPC, supra note 35, art. 138.
124. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 47(6) (“Any other natural or legal person, or any body 
entitled to bring actions in accordance with its national law, who is concerned by a patent,
may bring actions in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.” (emphasis added)). 
But it is unclear under this reading why Article 47(6) was not worded as clearly as Arti-
cle 47(7):
Any natural or legal person, or any body entitled to bring actions in accordance 
with its national law and who is affected by a decision of the European Patent . . .
entitled to bring actions under Article 32(1)(i).
UPCA, supra note 51, art. 47(7) (emphasis added).
125. For example, regarding a patent, the patent office is the agency concerned—not the 
post office.
126. See PATENT LITIGATION IN EUROPE, supra note 45, at 45, 71, 117. Sweden allows 
an action by “a public authority designated by the government.” Id. at 117. Italy allows an 
action by “a public prosecutor.” Id. at 71. Finland permits actions by “a public authority ap-
pointed by the government for reasons of public interest.” Id. at 45.
127. See supra note 103 (“Jede andere natürliche oder juristische Person oder jede Ver-
einigung, die von einem Patent betroffen und nach dem für sie geltenden nationalen Recht 
berechtigt ist, Klage zu erheben, kann nach Maßgabe der Verfahrensordnung Klage erheben.”
(emphasis added)). The phrase “die . . . berechtigt ist,” which includes the interest requirement 
and the national authorization requirement, seems to modify “jede Vereinigung.” The transla-
tion would then be: “Any other natural or legal person or any association concerned by a pa-
tent and entitled to bring an action under its national law may bring an action in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure.”
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unified patent right, the requirement is likely to be uniform. Given the ab-
sence of a requirement in the Draft Rules of Procedure to demonstrate con-
cern, the standard—if any—is likely to be modest, and perhaps only applied 
to governmental plaintiffs. The UPC might simply apply its principles of 
fairness and equity and examine whether the action is in bad faith. It is plau-
sible that the mandatory fixed fee to bring a revocation action acts as a 
proxy for standing to dissuade frivolous claims and indirectly assure some 
economic interest.128
IV. Comparison of the UPC and US PIPR Through the 
Lens of the Patent Troll Problem
On the surface, it appears that the UPC includes a much more effective 
anti-patent-troll PIPR mechanism than the United States does. But this de-
pends on the weight of certain structural disincentives within the UPC. This 
Part compares the UPC to the United States through the lens of the patent 
troll problem. Section IV.A notes that, under a structural analysis, the UPC 
seems to be a more expansive and accessible PIPR mechanism than exists in 
the United States. Section IV.B considers that not every patent troll–
asserted patent in Europe will be a unitary patent, and so certain structural 
features might dissuade patent owners from participating in the UPC at all 
and hence limit its effectiveness as an anti-troll procedure.
A. The UPC Promises a Much More Expansive Post-Issuance 
Patent Review System
The UPC appears to be more effective against trolls than the US system 
because of advantages in availability, judicial expertise, unification of 
standards, amendment practice, and forum limitations. In this sense, the 
UPC appears to be a much more vigorous PIPR system.
In many respects, the UPC resembles a structural hybrid of the US liti-
gation and administrative PIPR systems. But more importantly, it is broader 
than both in overall availability—apparently, nearly any party may bring a 
revocation action, and at any time, and on nearly any ground of unpatenta-
bility.
Compared to administrative PIPR in the United States, the UPC revoca-
tion proceeding is generally broader and more accessible: it is available on 
128. See PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT, RULES ON 
COURT FEES AND RECOVERABLE COSTS 9 (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.unified-patent-
court.org/sites/default/files/agreed_and_final_r370_subject_to_legal_scrubbing_to_secretariat
.pdf [hereinafter RULES ON COURT FEES].
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more grounds than IPR,129 to more parties than CBMR,130 and for a longer 
time than PGR.131
Additionally, a UPC judgment is more direct than an administrative de-
cision in the United States, where trial courts are generally not bound by 
PTAB decisions not yet affirmed by the Federal Circuit.132 The UPC also 
has exclusive competence on revocation actions for unitary patents—in the 
United States, the PTAB shares its invalidation power with district courts; 
thus, the UPC minimizes forum-based uncertainty in PIPR.133
Indeed, the technical-judge allocation procedure of the UPC also seems 
to limit the effects of forum shopping by patent troll plaintiffs.134 In the 
United States, by contrast, the effectiveness of PIPR can be attenuated by 
forum shopping by a savvy troll plaintiff.135 The UPCA’s rules that, if revo-
cation questions arise, judges from a centralized pool are allocated to those 
proceedings mean that with respect to questions of patent validity, a troll 
plaintiff has little forum choice.136 Additionally, the UPC’s Draft Rules note 
that where a revocation and infringement action are being tried separately, 
the revocation claim is to be accelerated.137
Additionally, amendment of a bad patent during the proceeding is man-
datory where feasible.138 Although in PIPR actions in the United States a 
party may, in theory, amend its own patent, the PTAB typically does not 
129. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012) (limiting IPR petitions to “only on a ground that 
could be raised under [statutory novelty or obviousness] and only on the basis of prior art con-
sisting of patents or printed publications”).
130. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) (2017) (limiting CBMR petitions to parties having been 
“sued for infringement of the patent or . . . charged with infringement under that patent”).
131. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (limiting PGR petitions to “9 months after the date of the 
grant of the patent”).
132. E.g., id. § 318(b) (establishing that the Patent Office Director only issues certifi-
cates of cancellation after both a PTAB decision and an exhaustion of any appeal); Rembrandt 
Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 853 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that 
PTAB decisions are not generally binding on district courts). This has led to situations where 
a patent is simultaneously (and paradoxically) held valid in one tribunal and invalid in anoth-
er. See, e.g., Tietz, supra note 32, at 353–61.
133. With respect to unitary patents, that is, and some European patents. National pa-
tents remain in place.
134. Brian Jacobsmeyer, Note, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Lessons for the Uni-
fied Patent Court, 25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 131, 151 (2019).
135. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
631, 646–51 (2015) (noting that in the 1970s, “the odds of having a patent found to be valid 
could differ by over fifty percent, depending on the circuit court that ultimately reviewed the 
case” and observing that even since the creation of a unified circuit court with exclusive sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction over patent cases, “forum shopping persists”); see also Kimberly A. 
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 889, 921–22 (observing that “forum and timing really do matter”).
136. See supra text accompanying note 80.
137. See Draft Rules of Procedure, supra note 106, r. 40(b).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 91–94.
324 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:303
grant such motions to amend.139 It remains to be seen whether UPC amend-
ment practice is permissive.
Compared to litigation-based PIPR in the United States, the UPC is 
similar in the extent of available grounds (that is, any grounds that would 
have prevented the patent’s issuance in the first place). But the UPC seem-
ingly unifies the law of patent examination and review, whereas district 
courts in the United States operate under different burden-of-proof and 
claim-construction rules than the PTAB.140 The relaxed standing require-
ment is also significant in comparing the UPC to litigation in the United 
States—a declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity in a US district 
court has a heightened standing requirement, limited to situations where the 
patent owner would otherwise have standing to sue the potential infringer.141
In comparison, the UPC bolsters the ability of firms to reduce their own 
economic uncertainty by bringing revocation actions before investment in 
potentially infringing technologies.
Additionally, in US patent litigation, judges (and juries) are generalists; 
the UPC, in contrast, employs judges with technical qualifications—with no 
juries.142 Such expertise is likely to improve the quality and accuracy of 
PIPR, at least compared to expert battles before US courts. In principle, 
then, the UPC should be more likely to get technical questions right and to 
accurately construe patent language.143 Further, unlike litigation, the UPC 
revocation proceeding enables selective amendments of patents. Combined 
139. See Tietz, supra note 32, at 368.
140. Anecdotally, patent examiners will often ignore citations to caselaw in patent appli-
cations and patent amendments unless the Patent Office has issued specific guidance docu-
ments.
141. See 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.03[4] (discussing standing 
for actions for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity). There is a generally lax standing 
requirement for administrative PIPR in the United States, however. This makes the adminis-
trative route more viable as a means to combat patent trolls, enabling a broad “private patent 
examiner” function. The actual use of IPR in the United States by parties without traditional 
Article III standing highlights the potential use and abuse of this “private patent examiner”
function. See, e.g., Michelle Carniaux & Michael E. Sander, Activists and Investors: A New 
Breed of IPR Petitioners?, IPR BLOG (June 20, 2014), http://interpartesreviewblog.com/
activists-investors-new-breed-ipr-petitioners/ (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/
20170118134439/http://interpartesreviewblog.com/activists-investors-new-breed-ipr-
petitioners/). For instance, the non-profit Electronic Frontier Foundation has taken to filing 
petitioners for IPR to eliminate so-called “illegitimate patents” that it has no financial interest 
in but sees as a threat to private citizens. Id. On the other hand, certain investors have filed 
IPRs against companies they plan to short-sell, for the purpose of tanking stock prices. Id.; see
also Paul Barrett, How Patent Trolls Sparked a Failed Assault on High Drug Prices,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-
10/how-patent-trolls-sparked-a-failed-assault-on-high-drug-prices.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 72–83.
143. See Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide?, supra note 47, at 1732 (“Specialization is 
generally desirable; the European system arguably produces more accurate evaluations of a 
patent’s validity than would a lay jury.”).
Spring 2019] The Unified Patent Court 325
with judicial expertise and equitable principles, this is likely to result in 
more sensible decisions regarding patent validity and scope.144
Compared to the United States, the UPC also benefits from a loser-pays 
fee regime. In the United States, administrative PIPR is seen as viable in 
part because it is substantially cheaper than litigation.145 But the lack of a 
loser-pays fee system means that patent troll lawyers can operate on a lean, 
contingent-fee basis, while those seeking PIPR necessarily incur costs. In 
contrast, the UPCA establishes that the losing party at the UPC will general-
ly bear the costs of the winner.146 This reduces the financial burden on pa-
tent challengers, especially where the likelihood of success is high.
Thus, as an ex post anti-troll PIPR vehicle, UPC revocation actions 
seem advantageous over PIPR in the United States in terms of availability, 
judicial expertise, unification of standards, amendment practice, and forum 
limitations. On the other hand, as discussed next, certain structural factors 
limit the potential applicability of the UPC system to the patent troll prob-
lem.
B. The UPC May Inadvertently Disincentivize 
Patent Owners from Participation
Despite its merits, PIPR under the UPC might be too-strong medicine. 
As discussed in this Section, the UPC exists alongside national patent sys-
tems.147 Patent owners have a choice of where to file patents. Accordingly, 
several features of the UPCA suggest that for patent owners in the industries 
144. See Mark A. Lemley, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2224–25 (2016) (ar-
guing that where the only option is declaring IP rights invalid altogether, rather than in part, 
courts are reluctant to find invalidity).
145. A motivation behind administrative PIPR in the United States was cost:
It was thought that having challengers file IPRs early in the district court litigation 
process would allow the district court case to be stayed before substantial resources 
were spent on the case and that patent validity issues would subsequently play out 
in the lower-cost IPR process. If the patent validity was upheld in the IPR, the liti-
gation would be streamlined because, as a result of the estoppel provisions, the 
challenger would be estopped from contesting in district court any validity issue 
that it could have presented in the IPR process; conversely, if the patent was invali-
dated in the IPR, the bulk of the district court litigation costs could be avoided en-
tirely.
Daniel Golub, IPRs Complicate the Litigation Funding Landscape for Patent Owners,
LANDSLIDE (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/landslide/2015-16/september-
october/iprs_complicate_litigation_funding_landscape_patent_owners.html.
146. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 69(1) (“Reasonable and proportionate legal costs and 
other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a general rule, be borne by the unsuc-
cessful party, unless equity requires otherwise, up to a ceiling set in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure.”). The volume of recoverable costs at the UPC exceeds those available both in 
the UK and in Germany. See Lunze & Rektorschek, supra note 119.
147. See, e.g., About the UPC, supra note 52 (“The UPC will not have any competence 
with regard to national patents.”).
326 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:303
amenable to patent troll behavior, the risk to opting in may outweigh the 
reward. Trolls may simply pick favorable national patent laws.
A crucial difference between the UPC and the United States is that in 
Europe, the UPC does not preempt national patent law.148 In the United 
States, a troll has only one patent system to opt into and must take with it 
the PIPR mechanisms in place, however draconian they might seem. This is 
not the case under the UPCA. For European patents, there will be a seven-
year transitional period in which a plaintiff may choose between the UPC 
and national courts.149 For European patents filed before the end of this peri-
od, patent owners may opt out entirely from the UPC’s jurisdiction.150 And 
inventors are free to pursue national patents instead.
There are several disadvantages, for patent owners, to the UPC system. 
The first is the fee-shifting provision. As previously discussed, the loser will 
generally pay,151 and so a patent owner risks being dragged into a revocation 
action without even having intended to enforce its patent. In the case of 
technology sectors with frequently overbroad patents—for instance, bio-
technology and computer technology152—this risk is aggravated. The risk is 
further aggravated by what looks like a lax standing requirement for bring-
148. Patent law in the United States is federal, and patent infringement causes of action 
are provided for by federal statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
149. See PATENT LITIGATION IN EUROPE, supra note 45, at 138.
150. See id. at 137. Some law firms already recommend opting out. See, e.g., Wil-
merHale The Future European Patent System: Update on the Latest News, JDSUPRA (Spring 
2016) https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-future-european-patent-system-74833/ (“The 
possibility to opt out non-unitary European patents during the (initial) seven-year transitional
period is one which all patentees must consider, in order to shelter their patents from the risk 
of a pan-European revocation by this unknown court.”).
151. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 69(1) (“Reasonable and proportionate legal costs and 
other expenses incurred by the successful party shall, as a general rule, be borne by the unsuc-
cessful party, unless equity requires otherwise, up to a ceiling set in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure.”). Notably, the UPCA notes that the court may take equitable considerations 
into account in fee-shifting, and the court’s draft rules on fees do institute a ceiling for fee 
shifting, as well as accounting for fairness:
Article 69 of the Agreement qualifies the general rule that the unsuccessful party 
shall bear the successful party’s costs by a number of principles, which serve as 
important safeguards when the Court makes its decision on costs, by allowing for 
exceptions from the general rule or limiting its application. . . . Firstly, only reason-
able and proportionate legal costs and other expenses incurred by the successful 
party may be recovered from the unsuccessful party. Moreover, equity may also 
serve as a self-standing ground for rendering the general rule inapplicable. Fur-
thermore, in case of partial success or in exceptional circumstances, the Court may 
order the parties to bear their own costs, or apply a different apportionment of cost, 
based on equity.
See RULES ON COURT FEES, supra note 128.
152. See Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents,
11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 18 n.62 (2005) (discussing debate around whether biotechnolog-
ical and software patents tend to be overbroad).
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ing a revocation action.153 Thus, where the value of an individual invention 
is uncertain,154 a prospective patent owner might perceive a high risk to opt-
ing into the UPC.
The UPC’s autonomy also highlights an institutional-dynamics concern. 
A product of an international treaty, the UPC is generally outside the control 
and competence of national courts and legislatures with respect to patent 
law issues.155 This lack of oversight was one reason that the legality of the 
UPC was challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, before the Court of Justice.156
Indeed, in what is perhaps surprising from the American perspective, the 
validity of a national property right will essentially be decided by two inter-
twined and remarkably autonomous international bodies. Patent owners un-
der the UPC’s jurisdiction might be concerned, for instance, about the fair-
ness of its procedural rules or substantive decisions. Yet it is unclear how 
patent owners could seek review. In contrast, the United States subjects the 
PTAB to Article III judicial oversight.157 There is some apparent oversight 
of the UPC, but it is limited. Decisions of the Court of Justice are binding, 
for instance.158 But the Court of Justice has indicated that its oversight will 
be limited—after all, patent eligibility is not governed by European Union 
law.159 The Rules of Procedure are promulgated internally by the Adminis-
trative Committee.160 The UPCA does require that the European Commis-
sion be consulted,161 but, as with the Court of Justice, this oversight is lim-
ited to compatibility with European Union law. Further, the UPC is self-
153. See supra text accompanying notes 98–125 (discussing standing). Although a 
plaintiff incurs a fixed fee of €20,000 to bring a revocation action—a sort of procedural proxy 
for the economic interest aspect of standing—this is still much lower than the average cost of 
litigation. See RULES ON COURT FEES, supra note 128, at 9.
154. See Sichelman, supra note 10, at 343 (“At [the filing] stage, especially for modern 
technologies, an invention is usually not in the form of a finished product ready for sale, and 
its commercial success is highly uncertain. . . . Indeed, many of the twentieth century’s great-
est inventions, including the television, radio, radar, and penicillin, were not commercialized 
until decades after they were invented.”).
155. See Jens Schovsbo et al., The Unified Patent Court: Pros and Cons of Specializa-
tion—Is There a Light at the End of the Tunnel (Vision)?, 46 IIC 271, 273 (2015).
156. See supra note 60.
157. For instance, by means of the Administrative Procedure Act, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 701–706 (2012), as well as statutory appealability of various USPTO decisions, see, e.g.,
35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012).
158. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 21.
159. See Case C-146/13, Spain v. European Parliament, 2015 WL Celex No. 
613CJ0146, ¶¶ 24, 28–32 (sidestepping Spain’s concerns that “the decisions of [the UPC] 
boards of appeal are not subject to any form of judicial review, since the European Patent Or-
ganisation enjoys immunity from legal proceedings and enforcement”); id. ¶¶ 90, 101 (re-
sponding to concerns that the UPC “does not lay down any guarantees for the preservation of 
EU law” by holding that “the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of an 
international agreement concluded by Member States”).
160. UPCA, supra note 51, art. 41.
161. Id. art. 41(2).
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funding162 and thus not subject to external withholding or spending pressure. 
The UPC, then, has more autonomy than the PTAB—a factor that might 
make patent owners, who have little political representation to ensure fair-
ness, hesitate.
Whether these factors matter will depend on the costs and benefits of 
opting into the UPC. A prime consideration for a patent troll is the strength 
of a market—the business model only works if there is a relatively wealthy 
industry to pressure into settlements.163 And such a market might not be ho-
mogeneous across Europe. For instance, patent trolls tend to target compa-
nies in specific industries—namely, electronics, machinery, and computer 
equipment164—and these industries (and wealth) are not equally distribut-
ed.165 Basically, a patent owner might only desire patents in the one or two 
countries with the potential for lucrative troll activity. Indeed, the incremen-
tal benefit of obtaining a unitary patent might be so low (for instance, no 
other companies to seek licenses from) and the incremental risk might be so 
high (for instance, twenty-five countries full of potential parties who could 
bring individual revocation actions) that a unitary patent might not make 
economic sense.166
Nevertheless, one feature of the internal market—regional patent ex-
haustion167—might limit the ability of patent trolls to rely only on select na-
tional patents. Like the concept of free movement of goods,168 the doctrine is 
that patent rights are exhausted Union-wide for a product once it undergoes 
an authorized sale anywhere in the European Union.169 Generally, exhaus-
162. Id. art. 36(1).
163. See Fusco, supra note 13, at 463–64 (“NPE activity is concentrated in markets 
where potential target companies produce high revenues. NPEs do not operate in countries, 
such as Poland, where the number of companies operating in the preferred industries is high, 
but revenues are low.”).
164. Id. at 456–57.
165. See id. at 463–64.
166. It might be argued that if there are no parties to assert patents against in a given 
country, then there are probably no parties with sufficient economic interest to pay the 
€20,000 revocation action fee. Nevertheless, certain countries might be active enough in the 
given technology to want to strike down an invalid patent (perhaps via an action brought by a 
collective interest group) but insufficiently wealthy to attract troll attention. 
167. See Philip P. Soo, Note, Enforcing a Unitary Patent in Europe: What the U.S. Fed-
eral Courts and Community Design Courts Teach Us, 35 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
55, 67–68 (2012) (describing patent exhaustion in the EU); see also UPCA, supra note 51,
art. 29.
168. TFEU, supra note 116, art. 26(2).
169. See Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147 
(“[O]bstacles to free movement may be justifiable for reasons of protection of industrial prop-
erty when the protection is invoked against a product coming from a Member State in which it 
is not patentable and has been manufactured by third parties without the consent of the patent-
ee or where the original patentees are legally and economically independent of each other; the 
derogation to the principle of free movement of goods is not justified when the product has 
been lawfully put by the patentee himself or with his consent, on the market of the Member 
State from which it is being imported, e.g. in the case of a holder of parallel patents.”).
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tion increases the incentive to seek as geographically broad patent protec-
tion as possible. Indeed, there is some suggestion that exhaustion limits pa-
tent troll activities.170
Because patent trolls are typically exclusive licensees or assignees ra-
ther than inventors,171 this choice-of-law question might have a muted im-
pact: if inventors opt for the UPC, then so must trolls. Thus, the economic 
considerations for patent trolls are likely less relevant than the economic 
considerations for inventors. Realistically, though, many inventors do not 
commercialize technology but rely on patent pooling firms to purchase and 
license their patents.172 Thus, the economic considerations of legitimate li-
censing firms and patent trolls are probably somewhat aligned. Of course, 
these economic considerations might just incentivize increased scrutiny in 
the drafting of patents expected to be economically important (and thus es-
pecially prone to validity challenges).173 That is, the prospect of heavy post-
issuance costs in defending or amending bad patents might incentivize in-
creased clarity and narrowly drafted patent claims.174 If so, this would indi-
rectly accomplish the same goal as ex post PIPR of bad patents already in 
the hands of trolls.
170. See, e.g., Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaus-
tion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 530 (2010).
171. See Sichelman, supra note 10, at 369 (characterizing patent trolls as “firms that do 
not commercialize their patented inventions and perform little to no R & D”).
172. Universities are one such example—although they frequently license patents, uni-
versities are not equipped to commercialize technology themselves. See Mark A. Lemley, Are 
Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 613–20
(2008) (observing parallels between university technology transfer practice and patent troll 
behavior).
173. Predicting the value of a patent, however, is difficult, and most patents are worth-
less. See Sichelman, supra note 10, at 343 (“About half, probably more, of all patented inven-
tions in the United States are never commercially exploited. . . . At [the prosecution] stage, 
especially for modern technologies, an invention is usually not in the form of a finished prod-
uct ready for sale, and its commercial success is highly uncertain”). Nonetheless, certain 
broad technology areas are statistically more susceptible to challenge. See, e.g., USPTO,
PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 5 (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AIA%20Statistics_March2017.pdf (indi-
cating that 60% of post-issuance patent challenges under the IPR mechanism in the US occur 
within electrical and computer technologies).
174. See Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 108–11 (2014) (arguing that the impact of an invalidity ruling “may 
have the effect of pushing applicants toward narrower, more conservative claims”). But see
Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 526 (2010) (arguing that 
the availability of amendments post-issuance is inefficient and that the best way to incentivize 
good patent drafting ex ante is to disallow such amendments) (“[T]he ability to amend claims 
allows patentees to cure any mistakes they make in drafting them. . . . Because patentees are 
the least-cost avoider of claim-drafting mistakes, this shifting of loss is inefficient.”); Yelder-
man, supra at 111–12 (acknowledging that “procedural preferences for post-grant narrowing 
amendments may create some incentives to seek broader claims in the first instance”). A fee-
shifting regime changes the cost calculus for a patent owner and arguably attenuates Professor 
Chiang’s concern.
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Conclusion
Post-issuance patent review (PIPR) is an invaluable error-correcting 
mechanism to prevent the socially harmful assertion of improperly issued 
patents. With the America Invents Act, the United States has recently estab-
lished a new system for PIPR, expanding administrative routes to curtail 
bad patents. Europe has apparently gone a step further with the revocation 
action created by the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPCA). The UPCA 
enables a revocation action on a broad range of grounds, at low cost, and 
with a relaxed standing requirement. But this is also an opt-in system with a 
loser-pays fee-shifting arrangement. Thus, although the structure of the 
UPC appears to be set up to facilitate efficient PIPR, the disincentives for 
opting in suggest that the UPC will be a less-effective troll-fighting vehicle 
than expected.
